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The Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA) plays an exceptional role in
the modern nuclear engineering, especially in detection of hazardous sub-
stances. However, in the aquatic environment, there are still many prob-
lems to be solved for effective usage of this technique. We present the status
of SABAT (Stoichiometry Analysis By Activation Techniques), one of the
projects aiming at construction of an underwater device for non-invasive
threat detection based on the NAA.
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1. Introduction
In the twenty-first century, the risk of terrorist attack has been constantly
growing around the world. This situation puts us in a need to develop
more effective methods to detect potential threats and smuggling of illicit
materials, e.g. explosives or drugs. New methods are needed particularly for
shores and ports protection and monitoring. They are very important also
in view of environmental protection of sea areas of intensive warfare, e.g.
the Baltic Sea [1, 2]. Over 250 kilotons of munition, mostly explosives, but
also many chemical agents were sunk into the Baltic Sea. It was estimated
that if only 16% of the sunken ammunition was released into the Baltic Sea
the life in the sea and at its shores would be entirely ruined for the next
100 years [3]. The precise knowledge of the location and amount of these
hazardous substances is crucial for a proper planning to deal with such an
ecological bomb.
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The presently used methods of detection are based on sonars followed by
divers inspection, which is not effective and rather expensive, and puts the
divers into danger due to unknown composition of the suspected items found
by the sonar. One of the methods which has a big potential to substitute or
support sonars is the Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA). It is based on fast
or thermal neutron beams which excite nuclei of investigated substance. De-
tection of characteristic gamma quanta emitted in de-excitation of the nuclei
allows one to identify the stoichiometry of the substance and determine if it
is dangerous [4, 5]. There are several designed and produced devices utiliz-
ing the NAA for detecting dangerous substances on the ground [6–10], but
in the water, one needs to overcome many difficulties connected to neutron
attenuation and a huge background from the oxygen and hydrogen. This
background can be reduced, for example, by using neutron generators with
associated α-particle measurement and by decreasing the distance between
the inspected object and the detector [1]. There are also solutions based
on low-energy neutrons which are moderated in water before reaching the
tested object. The detector is then registering gamma quanta originating
from thermal neutron capture [3].
In this article, we present a status of the design of a NAA-based device
within the SABAT project, where we use guides for the neutron beam and
gamma quanta emitted towards the detector. This method not only reduces
the background from water but may also provide a detection of dangerous
substances hidden deep in the bottom of the sea and may allow determi-
nation of the density distribution of the dangerous substance in the tested
object. Detailed description of the project can be found in [11] and [12].
2. Preliminary MCNP simulations of the SABAT
detection system
To design and optimize the SABAT detector in terms of high sensitivity
and interrogation time, we have performed Monte Carlo simulations using
the general Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP) package [13]. We
studied geometry of the system including the relative positions of gamma
quanta detector and the neutron generator, and the optimal guides dimen-
sions. Moreover, one needs to determine the optimal material composition
of the whole device. The simulated setup is shown in Fig. 1. A submarine
(blue rectangle — 1) is positioned above the seabed (in yellow — 6) inside
which there is an container with hazardous material. The gamma-quanta
detector and neutron source (generator) are placed inside the submarine and
are connected to guides filled with the air. Since we optimize the sensor for
the detection of war remnants, in particular chemical agents, we assume that
the simulated shell contains mustard gas (C4H8Cl2S). The generator emits
Underwater Detection of Dangerous Substances: Status of the SABAT . . . 1677
Fig. 1. (Colour on-line) Exemplary scheme of the simulated SABAT sensor geom-
etry. A submarine (blue rectangle — 1) with dimensions 300 × 300 × 200 cm3
contains the neutron source (yellow dot — 2) and gamma quanta detector (red
square — 3). The neutron and γ quanta guides (also blue — 4) are simulated
as 20 × 20 × 10 cm3 cuboid and 26 cm long polyhedron with 20 × 7.56 cm2 and
16.7 × 20 cm2 bases, respectively. A container with mustard gas with dimensions
194× 50× 50 cm3 (green — 5) is placed inside the bottom of the sea represented
by yellow rectangle (6) (400 × 400 × 151.5 cm3). Both the submarine and guides
are filled with air under normal pressure.
neutrons isotropically and only a small fraction which travels inside the
neutron guide reaches the interrogated item without any interaction. These
neutrons may activate the mustard gas via inelastic scattering or neutron
capture which result in emission of the characteristic gamma quanta which
are eventually registered by the detector. It is usually a semiconductor
detector, e.g. silicon or HPGe (High Purity Germanium), since it is char-
acterized by a very good energy resolution and detection efficiency. On the
other hand, they need a cooling system which limits mobility of the whole
device. Moreover, HPGe detectors are known to be sensitive to neutron
flux, which results in a degradation of the energy resolution over time. As
an alternative material, one usually uses scintillators. Among many com-
mercially available scintillator materials, we have, so far, considered BGO,
NaI(Tl) and LaBr3(Ce). BGO is more efficient than the other two mate-
rials due to high density, but it has the worst energy resolution [14]. The
best choice, according to Refs. [14, 15], is the LaBr3(Ce) with a good energy
and time resolutions and providing detection efficiency close to the one of
HPGe detectors. Exemplary energy spectra of the activated mustard gas
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obtained with 108 generated neutrons and assuming the gamma-quanta de-
tector made out of NaI(Tl) and LaBr3(Ce) are shown in Fig. 2 (a) and (b),
respectively. In the simulations, we assumed that the neutron generator
Fig. 2. (Colour on-line) Energy distributions simulated assuming the γ-quanta
detector made from (a) 3” × 3” NaI(Tl) and (b) 3” × 3” LaBr3(Ce). The black
curve represents simulations with mustard gas container, while in grey/red we
present background simulation when the gas is replaced by sand.
works in continuous beam mode. As expected for both distributions, we ob-
serve huge background with oxygen peaks around 5–6.5 MeV. The sulfur line
at 2.12 MeV is completely covered by very close hydrogen peak. Similarly,
the 4.4 MeV line of carbon is overwhelmed by the background, mostly by
the 4.5 MeV characteristic γ quanta of silicon [16, 17]. We see instead small
peaks from chlorine at 0.79, 1.16, 1.94 MeV, 7.42, 7.80 and 8.58 MeV. As
Underwater Detection of Dangerous Substances: Status of the SABAT . . . 1679
one can see, the NaI(Tl) detector does not provide a clear C peak and the
chlorine lines are much more smeared. The simulations indicate that the
performance of this detector could be improved by increasing its size but
the identification of potential threats will be anyway much more difficult
than in the case of LaBr3(Ce). To decrease the background from the water,
we introduced a 5 cm thick led shield around the gamma-quanta detector,
leaving open only the face connected to the γ-quanta guide. Unfortunately,
we did not see any improvement in the sensitivity of the simulated sensor.
Fig. 3. (Colour on-line) Energy distributions simulated assuming the γ-quantum
registration time (a) within 50 ns after neutron emission and (b) bigger than 2 µs
after neutron emission. The detector is simulated as 3”×3” LaBr3(Ce) scintillator.
The black curve represents simulations with the mustard gas container, while in
grey/red we present background simulation when the gas is replaced by sand.
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The performed simulations allowed us also to analyze time structure of
the activation processes during the interrogation of the suspected object.
In general, there are two gamma-quanta groups contributing to the energy
distributions measured by the detector. First group consists of the prompt
gammas hitting the detector within tens of nanoseconds after the neutron
emission, depending on the distances between the activated object, neutron
source and the detector. These gamma quanta originate mostly from the
nucleus excitation by the inelastic scattering. The other group of gammas
is registered much later and comes from the thermal neutron capture. The
14.1 MeV neutrons need to be moderated before they can be captured which
takes relatively long time.
Figure 3 (a) shows the energy spectra of gamma quanta registered by the
detector in the 50 ns time window after the neutron emission for the mustard
gas and background. Surprisingly, one can observe a noise reduction in the
energy region of the sulfur peak. Moreover, it turns out that our detection
system is sensitive to another Cl line in this energy range. The 4.4 MeV line
of carbon is unfortunately again merged with Si line. Chlorine is visible also
for delayed γ quanta shown in Fig. 3 (b) which were registered 2 µs after
neutron emission. This time window provides excellent selectivity of many
Cl lines (1.16, 7.42, 7.80 and 8.58 MeV).
3. Conclusions and outlook
We have been developing a new system for underwater threats detection
based on the Neutron Activation Analysis. This device has been optimized,
in particular, to detect chemical agents like mustard gas, soman, sarin, etc.
To find the best geometry and materials to build the sensor, we have per-
formed Monte Carlo simulations using the MCNP software. The first pre-
liminary results show that despite large environmental noise from the water
and sand on the bottom of the sea, we are able to detect the signature of the
hidden mustard gas. According to the simulations, the characteristic lines
of chlorine are well-visible at low energies, while carbon and sulfur are over-
whelmed by background. It turns out that the energy resolution of NaI(Tl)
detector is too poor to give satisfactory results. Thus, the best material to
replace semiconductor detector qualified to be LaBr3(Ce) providing not only
good energy and time resolutions, but also reasonable detection efficiency.
Analysis of the arrival time distribution of measured gamma quanta shows
that even rough time gating gives very promising results. For prompt pho-
tons, we are able to measure the sulfur and chlorine lines originating from the
mustard gas. Unfortuntely, the 4.5 MeV line of Si overlaps with the carbon
line around 4.4 MeV. The delayed gamma quanta spectrum shows excellent
selectivity of many Cl lines (1.16, 7.42, 7.80 and 8.58 MeV). Altogether, we
Underwater Detection of Dangerous Substances: Status of the SABAT . . . 1681
are sensitive to at least two elements of mustard gas which may provide sto-
ichiometry identification. As it was mentioned before, the noise originating
from the environment can be significantly reduced by the requirement of the
coincident detection of the alpha particles which are produced together with
neutrons [11]. The α-particle detection and its registration time measure-
ment will be included as the next step in the simulations. This will allow
for a final design of the SABAT sensor.
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